This paper presents a complete description and the results of the Looking Forward Approach for cooperative differential games with transferable utility. The approach is used for constructing game theoretical models and defining solutions for conflict-controlled processes where information about the process updates dynamically or for differential games with dynamic updating. It is supposed that players lack certain information about the dynamical system and payoff function over the whole time interval on which the game is played. At each instant, information about the game structure updates, players receive new updated information about the dynamical system and payoff functions. A resource extraction game serves as an illustration in order to compare a cooperative trajectory, imputations, and the imputation distribution procedure in a game with the Looking Forward Approach and in the original game with a prescribed duration.
Introduction
This research examines a cooperative differential game with transferable utility in which the game structure can change or update with time (time-dependent formulation) and it is assumed that the players do not have information about the change of the game structure over the full time interval, but they have certain information about the game structure over the truncated time interval. Under the information about the game structure we understand information about the dynamical system and payoff functions. The interpretation can be given as follows: players have certain information about the game structure, but the duration of this information is less than the length of the initial game. Evidently, this truncated information is valid only for a certain time and has to be updated. In order to define the best possible behavior for players in this type of cooperative differential game, a special approach is needed, which is called the Looking Forward Approach. This approach brings up the following points: how to define a cooperative trajectory, how to define a cooperative solution and allocate the cooperative payoff, and what properties the obtained solution will have. This paper answers these questions and gives an overview of the results corresponding to the Looking Forward Approach. It is demonstrated that the newly built arbitrary solution for a class of differential games with dynamic updating is not only time consistent (which is very rare in cooperative differential games), but is also strongly time consistent. Haurie analyzed the problem of the dynamic instability of Nash bargaining solutions in differential games [1] . The notion of the time consistency of differential game solutions was formalized mathematically by Petrosyan [14] who presented results related to the connection between solutions chosen by the players in truncated subgames and in the overall game. The notion of the characteristic function for the general game is introduced, with the help of this and the solution for the general game, it is proved that solutions chosen by the players in the truncated subgames correspond to the resulting solution based on the new characteristic function.
The concept of the Looking Forward Approach is new in game theory especially in cooperative differential games and gives a foundation for the further study of differential games with dynamic updating. There are currently almost no results in constructing approaches for modeling conflict-controlled processes where information about the process updates in real time. To get more information about the approach one may read the following papers: [7] , [8] , [9] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [25] , [26] . In [21] the Looking Forward Approach was applied to a cooperative differential game with a finite horizon. The notion of a truncated subgame, the procedure for defining optimal strategies, a conditionally cooperative trajectory and solution concept, and the solution property of ∆t-time consistency for a fixed information horizon were determined. [23] focuses on the study of the Looking Forward Approach with a stochastic forecast and dynamic adaptation when information about the conflicting process can change during the game. In [9] the Looking Forward Approach was applied to a cooperative differential game of pollution control. The paper studies the dependency of the resulting solution on the value of the information horizon, and the corresponding optimization problem was formulated and solved. In [22] the Looking Forward Approach was applied to a cooperative differential game with an infinite horizon. In [26] the Looking Forward Approach with a random horizon was presented, which is one of the variations of the Looking Forward Approach introduced in [21] . Papers [7] and [8] study cooperative differential games with an infinite horizon where information about the process updates dynamically, the focus of the papers is a profound formulation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for different types of forecasts and information structures. In [24] an imputation distribution procedure (IDP)-core was used as a cooperative solution and it was proved that the resulting solution is strongly time consistent. The last paper on the Looking Forward Approach [25] is devoted to studying the Looking Forward Approach for cooperative differential games with nontransferable utility and the real life application of the Looking Forward Approach to economic simulations.
The characteristic function of a coalition is an essential concept in the theory of differential games. This function is defined in [27] as the total payoff for players from coalition S in Nash equilibrium in a game with the following set of players: coalition S (acting as one player) and players from the set N \ S. A computation of the Nash equilibrium fully described in [32] is necessary for this approach. A set of imputations or a solution for the game is determined by the characteristic function at the beginning of each subinterval. For any set of imputations the IDP first introduced by Petrosyan in [16] is analyzed. See recent publications on this topic in [15] , [29] , [30] . In order to determine a solution for the whole game combined partial solutions and their IDP on subintervals is required. The property of time consistency and strong time consistency introduced by Petrosyan in [12] and [14] are also examined for the proposed solution.
The Looking Forward Approach has similarities with the Model Predictive Control (MPC) theory worked out within the framework of numerical optimal control. We analyze [10] , [11] , [19] , [33] to get recent results in this area. MPC is a method of control when the current control action is achieved by solving at each sampling instant a finite horizon open-loop optimal control problem using the current state of an object as the initial state. This type of control is able to cope with strict limitations on controls and states, which is an advantage over other methods. There is, therefore, a wide application in petro-chemical and related industries where key operating points are located close to the set of admissible states and controls. The main problem that is solved in MPC is the provision of movement along the target trajectory under the conditions of random perturbations and an unknown dynamical system. At each time step the optimal control problem is solved for defining controls which will lead the system to the target trajectory. The Looking Forward Approach on the other hand solves the problem of modeling player behavior when information about the process updates dynamically. This means that the Looking Forward Approach does not use the target trajectory, but answers the question of composing a trajectory which will be used by players, and the question of allocating the cooperative payoff along the composed trajectory.
To demonstrate the Looking Forward Approach we present an example of a cooperative resource extraction game with a finite horizon. The original example was introduced in [29] , the problem of time consistency in this game was examined in [6] . We present both analytic and numerical solutions for specific parameters. The comparison between the original game and the game with the Looking Forward Approach is presented. In the final part of the example model we demonstrate the strong time consistency of the solution. The structure of the article is as follows. In section 1 the description of the original game is presented. In Section 2, the definition of a truncated subgame is presented. In Section 3 the solution of the truncated subgame is described, and the conditionalcooperative trajectory is constructed. In Section 4, based on the results in section 3, a solution is constructed in a game with dynamic updating, the theorem of strong ∆t-time consistency is presented. Section 5 is devoted to the construction of the characteristic function in a game with dynamic updating. In Section 6, the connection between the solutions in truncated subgames and the resulting solution in the original game with dynamic updating is described and formalized mathematically. In Section 7, the Looking Forward Approach is applied to a three player cooperative resource extraction game. The results of a numerical simulation in Matlab are presented.
The Original Game
Consider an n-player differential game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with a finite horizon T − t 0 , with an initial state x 0 ∈ R m and an initial time instant t 0 (t 0 and T are a fixed values). Denote the set of players by N = {1, . . . , n}. At each time instant player i ∈ N chooses a control or a strategy
The payoff function of the player i ∈ N is defined by
subject to the dynamical systemẋ
where x(τ ) ∈ R m is the trajectory (the solution) of the system (1) with the control input u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), r ≥ 0, functions h i (x(τ ), u(τ )) and g(t, x, u) are differentiable. h i (x(τ ), u(τ )) shows an instant payoff that is received by player i ∈ N in state x(τ ) ∈ R m with control input u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), function e −r(τ −t 0 ) defines the discount factor for the players' payoff. The solution of the system (1) determines the trajectory of the game.
When open-loop strategies are used, we require piece-wise continuity with a finite number of breaks. For feedback strategies we follow [32] . We require that for any n-tuple of strategies u(t, x) = (u 1 (t, x), . . . , u n (t, x)) the solution of the Cauchy problem of (1) exists and is unique at the time interval [t 0 , T ]. For a more sophisticated definition of feedback strategies in zero-sum differential games see [20] .
Truncated Subgame
As mentioned above, during time interval [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t] players have full information about the dynamics of the game and the payoff function on time interval [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ], where T is a fixed value, namely the information horizon. At time instant t = t 0 + (j + 1)∆t information about the game is being updated. At the next time interval (t 0 + (j + 1)∆t, t 0 + (j + 2)∆t] players have full information about the game structure at time interval (t 0 + (j + 1)∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t + T ]. For j = 0 we suppose that t j−1 = 0.
To model this type of information structure we introduce the following definition (Fig.  1) . Denote vector x j,0 = x(t 0 + j∆t). 
subject to the dynamical systeṁ
with the initial condition x j,0 of the truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ). 
Solution of a Cooperative Truncated Subgame
Consider a truncated cooperative subgameΓ c j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) defined on the time interval [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ] with the initial condition x(t 0 + j∆t) = x j,0 . The total payoff of players to be maximized in this game is
This is an optimal control problem. Sufficient conditions for the solution and the optimal feedback are given by the following assertion [28] . Denote the maximum value of joint payoff (5) by the function W (j∆t) (t, x):
where x, t are the initial state and time of the subgame of the truncated game respectively and
where lim
is optimal in the control problem defined by (5) , (6) . Theorem 1 requires that the function W (j∆t) be C 1 . However, it is possible to assume continuity only considering viscosity-solutions using the Subbotin approach [2] , [3] . But due to the shortage of space, it is not possible to properly introduce and define this solution in this paper. In the example model we define and get solution W (j∆t) from C 1 .
Conditionally cooperative trajectory
During the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) players possess only truncated information about its structure. Obviously, this is not enough to construct optimal control and the corresponding trajectory for the game Γ(x 0 , T −t 0 ). As a cooperative trajectory in the game Γ(x 0 , T −t 0 ) we propose using a conditionally cooperative trajectory defined in the following way: Definition 2. A conditionally cooperative trajectory {x
is defined as a composition of cooperative trajectories x * j (t) in the truncated cooperative subgames Γ 
On the time interval [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t] a conditionally cooperative trajectory coincides with the cooperative trajectory x * j (t) in the truncated cooperative subgamē Γ c j (x * j−1 (t 0 + j∆t), t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ). In the position x * j (t 0 + (j + 1)∆t) at the time instant t = t 0 + (j + 1)∆t information about the game structure updates. On the time interval (t 0 + (j + 1)∆t, t 0 + (j + 2)∆t] the trajectoryx * (t) coincides with the cooperative trajectory x * j+1 (t) in the truncated cooperative subgameΓ 
Characteristic Function
For each coalition S ⊂ N and j = 0, . . . , l define the values of the characteristic function as in [27] :
is defined as the total payoff for players from coalition S in Nash equilibrium u
) in the game with the following set of players: coalition S (acting as one player) and players from the set N \ S, i.e. in the game with |N \ S| + 1 players.
An imputation ξ j (x j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) is defined as an arbitrary vector which satisfies the conditions
Denote the set of all possible imputations for each truncated subgame by E j (x * j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ). Suppose that for each truncated subgame a non-empty solution is defined:
This can be a Core, an NM solution, a Nucleus, or a Shapley value.
Solution Concept in an Original Game with Dynamic Updating
It is logical to assume that the distribution of the total payoff between players in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) along the conditionally cooperative trajectory {x In order to construct a solution in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ), you need to define the IDP for all truncated subgamesΓ
is also defined as in (10) . We denote by E j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) the set of imputations in the subgameΓ
and the corresponding IDP are selected
which guarantees the time consistency of the selected imputation [16] :
The IDP β j (t, x * j ) can be obtained by differentiating the imputation ξ j (x * j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ), the corresponding theorem is presented in [6] :
The new solution concept in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) consists of a combination of solutions W j (x * j,0 , t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T ) (corresponding to the IDP) in truncated subgameŝ Γ
. Define the resulting IDP for the whole game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) as follows:
Using the resulting IDPβ(t,x * ) we define the following vector:
. . , l determines the distribution of the total payoff among players usingβ(t,x * ).
Definition 4 The resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) is the vector defined by the resulting IDPβ(t,x
* ) in the following way, let t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t]:
in particular:ξ
We introduce the concept of the resulting solution in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with dynamic updating:
Definition 5 The resulting solutionŴ (x * (t), T − t) is the set of the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t), (15) for all possible resulting IDPβ(t,x * ) (14).
In [23] , it was proved that using the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) and the corresponding resulting solutionŴ (x * (t), T − t) you can allocate actual total payoffs among players: 
The resulting solutionŴ (x 0 , T − t 0 ) is time consistent by construction. In [21] it was proved that it also has the property of strong time consistency:
in which a ⊕ A = {a + a ′ : a ′ ∈ A}. Theorem 3. An arbitrary resulting solutionŴ (x 0 , T − t 0 ) is strongly ∆t-time consistent in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with the prescribed duration.
Under an arbitrary resulting solution we understand any resulting solution which is constructed using solutions W j (x * j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ), j = 0, . . . , l as an arbitrary subset of the set of imputations E j (x * j,0 , t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T ). Solutions in each truncated subgame can differ, i.e. in the first truncated subgame players can choose a Core, in the second truncated subgame players can choose a Shapley value etc.
The Construction of the Characteristic Function in a Game with Dynamic Updating
As the characteristic function in a differential game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with dynamic updating, the resulting characteristic function is used.
Definition 7
The resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) in the game Γ(x * (t), T − t) with dynamic updating the function calculated using the values of the characteristic functions V j (S; x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) in every truncated subgameΓ
where
In the following theorem it is shown that the resulting imputationξ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) can be used as an imputation in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with V (S; x 0 , T − t 0 ) used as a characteristic function. 
Proof. First let us show that for ∀t ∈ [t 0 , T ] the following conditions are fulfilled:
According to the definition ofξ(x * (t), T − t) and V (S;x * (t), T − t) left part of (20) can be rewritten as:
.
Since the condition (23) in (22) is satisfied then (20) is correct.
Now lets prove (21) by substituting the expressionξ i (x * (t), T − t) and V ({i};x * (t), T − t) for left part of (21) . For right part of (21) we substitute V ({i}; 
and for ∀t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t], m = 0, . . . , l is fulfilled
The fulfillment of condition (26) for ∀t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t], m = 0, . . . , l implies the fulfillment of condition (25) . Rewrite (26):
The condition (27) means that in every truncated subgame changing the values of the characteristic function and imputation according to the time happens evenly in reference to each other. The theorem is proved. In this paragraph, the notion of the characteristic function V (S; x 0 , T − t 0 ) in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with dynamic updating is introduced. It is shown that the resulting imputationξ(x 0 , T −t 0 ) is an imputation in the classical meaning fulfilled with individually rational conditions. Nevertheless condition (19) is not fulfilled ∀t ∈ [t 0 , T ].
The Relationship of Solutions in Truncated Subgames and the Resulting Solutions
In this paragraph it is shown that if players choose the imputation
. . , l in every truncated subgame by the same rule, then the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) corresponds to the imputation chosen by the same rule using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t). Further prove of it for the number of optimality principals. First of all show, that if in every truncated subgameΓ j (x * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) players choose a Shapley value Sh j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) as an imputation, then the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) (15) coincides with the Shapley valueŜh(x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ), calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) . * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ):
where t ∈ [t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T ], j = 0, . . . , l. Then the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T −t) coincides withŜh(x * (t), T − t):
whereŜh(x * (t), T − t) is the Shapley value calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18).

Proof.
In this case the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) is calculated by following formulas (14), (15) using the Shapley values Sh
. . , l is calculated by following formula
Sh j i (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) = ∑ S⊂N i∈S (|N | − |S|)!(|S| − 1)! |N |! · · ( V j (S; x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) − V j (S\{i}; x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) ) .(29)
Sh(x * (t), T − t) is calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t). Substitute the expression for V (S;x * (t), T − t) in the formula forŜh(x * (t), T − t). let t ∈
After substitution of (29) in (28) we obtain (30) . Theorem is proved. The same result can be obtained for the proportional solution. Suppose that the characteristic function V ({i}; x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) is differentiable along the cooperative trajectory x * j (t). Define the proportional solution using its IDP β P rop j (t) in the following way:
The corresponding imputation, obtained by the direct integration of β P rop j (t) using the formula (12) and is denoted by P rop j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ). Prove that in every truncated subgameΓ j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) players choose the proportional solution P rop j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) (31), then the resulting imputation, defined by the formulaξ(x * (t), T − t) (15) coincides with the proportional solution P rop(x * (t), T − t) (31), calculated using the characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18).
Theorem 6. Suppose that in every truncated subgameΓ
where t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ], j = 0, . . . , l. Then the resulting vectorξ(x * (t), T − t) will coincide withP rop(x * (t), T − t) (31) :
is the proportional solution calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) . Proof. In this case the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) is calculated using the formula (14) for the IDP using the combination of the values of the IDP for the proportional solution (31) in every truncated subgame on the interval [t 0 + j∆t,
Show that the formula forP rop(x * (t), T − t) or for the IDPβ P rop (t) (31), where we use V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) as a characteristic function leads to the right part of (31) . Substitute the expression for V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) in (31) . Consider one of the addends. Let t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t]:
. (32) From (32) we can see, that for t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + (j + 1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l under the derivative sign there is only one addend, depending on t, therefore
Substitute (33) and the formula for V (N ;x * (t), T − t) (31) . It is easy to see, that in this case the right hand side of IDPβ P rop (t) and (31) are equal. Theorem is proved. Show, that if in every truncated subgameΓ j (x * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) players choose the Core C j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) as the optimality principle, then the resulting solution, every element of which isξ(x * (t), T − t) (15) is a Core, calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) . Theorem 7. Suppose that in every truncated subgameΓ j (x * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ):
the following is satisfied
whereĈ(x * (t), T − t) is the Core, calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) . Proof. The following statements should be proven:
belongs to the CoreĈ(x * (t), T − t), calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t).
The
CoreĈ(x * (t), T − t) shouldn't contain an imputation ξ(x * (t), T − t), for which it is impossible to find a set of imputations in truncated subgames
for each t ∈ [t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T ], j = 0, . . . , l, i = 1, . . . , n, then the resulting imputation ξ(x * (t), T − t) satisfies the system of inequalities:
Substitute the expressionξ(x * (t), T − t) for the left hand side of (35). For the right hand side of (35) substitute (18) . As in theorem 6. show that for every S ⊂ N , t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ] the fulfilment of (35) leads to the fulfilment of (34). The first statement is proved.
Further prove the second statement, that in the set of imputations ξ j i (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . , l, satisfying the system of inequalities ∀j = 0, . . . , l, S ⊂ N :
there exists at least one set of ξ
Proof from the opposite. Suppose, that for the imputations satisfying (34) and (37) the inequality is not satisfied (36). Show that for ∀j = 0, . . . , l the following condition is satisfied:
then from (37) the sign of the right and left hand sides are always positive, and using (34) it follows that (38) is satisfied. The theorem is proved.
The same results can be obtained for an IDP-core, a new cooperative solution presented in [24] . Introduce the following notation:
where t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ] and S ⊆ N . Define B j (t) as a set of integrable vector functions β j (t) satisfying the following system of inequalities:
Then using the set B j (t, x * j ) it is possible to define the following set of vectors:
we shall call an IDP-core and denote it as C j (x * j (t), t 0 + j∆t + T ), where
and for
In [24] it was also proved that an IDP-core is strongly time consistent. Show, that if in every truncated subgamê Γ j (x * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) players choose an IDP-core C j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) (41) as an optimality principle, then the resulting solution, every element of which is defined by formula (15) , is an IDP-core, calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) .
whereĈ(x * (t), T −t) is the IDP-core, calculated using the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) .
Proof.
The resulting solutionŴ (x * (t), T − t) consists of ξ(x * (t), T − t), each of which is defined by the IDP set of imputations (14) . According to the definition of an IDP-core, each imputation from the IDP-core satisfies the following system of inequalities (40):
Thus, the resulting solutionŴ (x
Write out the expression forĈ(x * (t), T − t) with the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t) (18) . Show, that it leads to (40). Consider separately one of the constraints in it and substitute the expression for V (S;x
From (43) it follows that for t ∈ [t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +(j +1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l under the desired sign there is only one addend depending on t, so
Substitute (44) in the formula forĈ(x * (t), T − t):
Thus, the IDP-coreĈ(x * (t), T − t) with the resulting characteristic function V (S;x * (t), T − t), coincides with the resulting solutionŴ (x * (t), T − t), calculated using the combination of solutions C j (x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) in the truncated subgames. The theorem is proved.
In this paragraph it is shown, that if players in every truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) choose a proportional solution, a Shapley value, an imputation from Core or an imputation from an IDP-core as an optimality principle, then the resulting imputation is also a proportional solution, a Shapley value, an imputation from Core or an imputation from an IDP-core in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with dynamic updating.
The theorems proved in this section give the approach for directly calculating the resulting solution.
The Cooperative Limited Resource Extraction Game with Dynamic Updating
Consider the resource extraction game defined on a closed time interval. The solution of the two person game in the classical form is presented in [29] . The problem of time consistency was studied by Yeung [6] . In this example, a game of limited resource extraction with dynamic updating for three persons is presented. A Core is used as an optimality principle. The characteristic function is calculated as in [27] . In the last part of the example the property of strong time consistency is discussed.
Initial Game
The following dynamical system describes the change in the stock of resources
where u i is the player's production level i = 1, 3. The payoff of player i:
where c i is a constant,
Truncated Subgame
The initial game Γ( 
The payoff function of player i is:
Consider the case when players agree to cooperate in the truncated subgamê Γ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ). Then players act to maximize the total payoffs.
Cooperative Trajectory
Suppose that the maximum joint payoff of players in each truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) has the following form [29] :
where functions A j (t), C j (t) satisfy the system of differential equations:
The cooperative trajectory x * j (t) in each truncated subgame can be calculated as follows [29] :
where t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ] and
The initial position for the cooperative trajectory in each truncated subgame is defined from the previous truncated subgame: x * 0,0 = x 0 and x * j,0 = x * j−1 (t 0 + j∆t) for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. The conditionally cooperative trajectoryx * (t) is defined as follows:
Characteristic Function
In order to allocate the cooperative payoff between players in each truncated subgame, it is necessary to determine the values of the characteristic function V j (S; x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) for each coalition S ⊂ N . In accordance with the formula (10), the maximum total payoff for players W j (t 0 +j∆t, x j,0 ) (46) corresponds to the value of the characteristic function V j (N ; x j,0 , t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T )) of the coalition S = N in the truncated subgamê Γ j v (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ):
where t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ], j = 0, . . . , l. Next, we need to determine the values of the characteristic function for the following coalitions:
For each coalition {i}, i = 1, 3, we need to determine the Nash equilibrium in the truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) and as a result V j ({i}; x * j (t), t, t 0 + j∆t + T ).
One Player Coalitions
The Nash equilibrium in the truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 +j∆t, t 0 +j∆t+T ) is determined by the following strategies of players:
where functions A j i (t) for i = 1, 3 are defined by the system of differential equations:
The corresponding payoff for players i = 1, 3 in the Nash equilibrium is determined by the function:
The value of the characteristic function for coalitions consisting of one player S = {i}, i ∈ N is calculated as follows:
where t ∈ [t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ], j = 0, . . . , l.
Two Player Coalitions
In accordance with the formula (10), the characteristic function V j (S; x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) for coalitions consisting of two players S = {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} is defined as the best reply of coalition S against the strategies from the Nash equilibrium u
) in the truncated subgameΓ j (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ), used by players from N/S. In our case, this means that players from coalition S act as one player and maximize their total payoff. Using this approach, we determine the equilibrium between the two players: the combined player (coalition S), and a player not included in the coalition S (coalition N/S).
Consider the formula for V j (S; x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) in the case of S = {1, 2}. The formula for the remaining coalitions can be obtained by the same principle:
satisfy the system of differential equations:
The value of the characteristic function of coalition S = {1, 2} is calculated as follows:
The Concept of the Solution
Suppose that in each cooperative truncated subgameΓ j v (x j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) the players use a Core as the principle of optimality. This means that players in each truncated subgame choose the imputation ξ j (x * j , t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) ∈ C j (x * j (t), T − t) according to the following rule:
. . , l can be calculated by the formula (15) . We denote byĈ(x * (t), T − t) the set of imputationsξ(x * (t), T − t) constructed using (14) and (15) . Using the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5, the solutionĈ(x * (t), T − t) can be constructed according to the following rule:
where V (S;x * (t), T − t) is calculated using the formula (18). Further, using an example of a particular deviation fromĈ(x * (t), T − t), we show that the solution constructed is strongly ∆t-time consistent in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ).
Numerical Simulation
Consider a numerical example of the resource extraction game defined on the time interval T − t 0 = 4, in which information about the game is known on the time interval with the duration T = 2 and is updated every ∆t = 1 time interval. The following parameters for the equation of motion a = 5, b = 0.3 for the payoff function c 1 = 0.15, c 2 = 0.65, c 3 = 0.45 and for the initial conditions t 0 = 0, x 0 = 250 are fixed. Figure 5 . shows the optimal strategies for the first player in the game with dynamic updating (solid line) and optimal strategies in the original game [29] (dotted line) with a prescribed duration.
The conditionally cooperative trajectoryx * (t) is constructed using the cooperative trajectories in truncated subgamesΓ j (x * j,0 , t 0 + j∆t, t 0 + j∆t + T ) with the dynamical system (45). In Figure 6 . the comparison of the conditionally cooperative trajectorŷ x * (t) (solid line) in the game with dynamic updating and the cooperative trajectory x * (t) (dashed line) in the original game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) [29] is displayed. For limited information, resource development occurs faster, because players are guided by a reduced time interval. The abscissa axis in Figure 6 . determines the time t, the ordinate axis determines stock of resource x. (18) , t ∈ [t 0 , T ] is obtained. Using (50)Ĉ(x * (t), T − t) is constructed in the game with dynamic updating Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) (see Fig.9.) .
Demonstrate the property of the strong ∆t-time consistency of the solution C(x * (t), T − t). Suppose that at the beginning of the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) the players agree to use the proportional solutionP rop(x * (t), T − t) (31) (further it is shown for the given parametersP rop(x * (t), T − t) ∈Ĉ(x * (t), T − t)). Now suppose that at some point in time t br = t 0 + m∆t ∈ [t 0 , T ] players decided to chose another imputation from 
In Figure 8 . the resulting IDP for the proportional solutionβ P rop (t,x * ) (solid line) and β(t,x * ) for the combined solution (51) (dashed line) are displayed. In order to obtain the imputation (15) corresponding to the combined solutionβ(t,x * ) (51) it is integrated by t. Denote the result of the integration byξ(x * (t), T − t). In accordance with the resulting imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) players allocate a joint payoff in the game Γ(x 0 , T − t 0 ) with dynamic updating in the following way: In Figure 9 . one can observe that the imputation corresponding to the combined solutionξ(x * (t), T − t) (dashed line) belongs toĈ(x * (t), T − t) (the selected region) for all t ∈ [t 0 , T ]. This shows the property of strong ∆t-time consistency ofĈ(x * (t), T − t), since the imputationξ(x * (t), T − t) was constructed by the deviation of players from the proportional solutionP rop(x * (t), T − t) (solid line) at the instant t br = t 0 + j∆t in favor of the Shapley valueŜh(x * (t br ), T − t br ). Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of HSE.
